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THE U.S. CONGRESS PASSED the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act in August 1996.
The new law changed the nature, organization, and financing of a crucial part of the U.S. safety net.
Under the old cash assistance program established in the 1930s, the federal government offered
states open-ended grants for welfare benefits for needy children and their parents.  States were
obliged to match the federal dollars to get the grants, but federal spending had no fixed limit.  States
were free to define need, establish benefits, and determine eligibility as they saw fit, though the
federal law required that families be eligible to receive assistance payments for as long as they
remained poor and contained a dependent child under age 18.
The 1996 law replaced aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) with a federal block
grant called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  While minor exceptions will be
made for low-income states with fast-growing populations and states in recession, most states’
TANF grants will be determined by their federal AFDC grants during the two or three years before
the 1996 law was passed.  The new law ends the individual entitlement to benefits.  Under new state
programs, poor children may no longer be automatically entitled to cash benefits.  The 1996 law
gives states more program flexibility in many areas, but it also imposes tough new federal
requirements.  In particular, each state must now ensure that a rising percentage of its adult aid
recipients is engaged in approved work.  The head of each family on welfare is required to work
within two years after assistance payments begin.  Work hours requirements are stringent, and states
will face increasingly harsh penalties for failing to meet them.  States will not be permitted to use
the federal grant to pay for cash benefits that last longer than 60 months for a particular family.
Although exceptions can be made for some hardship cases, Congress’s clear intention is to limit
benefits to the great majority of families to no more than five years.  States may adopt even tighter- 2 -
restrictions on the length of benefit payments.  Several have already decided to impose time limits
shorter than 60 months.
The 1996 law represents the culmination of a determined effort to reduce the number of
single mothers who collect public aid and to increase the number who support themselves through
work.  U.S. liberals once hoped to achieve this goal by improving the job qualifications of poor
single mothers, by supplementing the earned incomes of low-wage breadwinners, and by increasing
the support services available to low-income workers.  Conservatives favored an approach that
limited single parents’ access to welfare, trimmed monthly benefits, and forced welfare recipients
to participate in work or job search programs.  For the most part, the new law represents a triumph
of the conservative approach, although Congress has increased federal funding for several kinds of
supportive services, including child care and worker training.  Taking a longer term perspective,
Congress and successive presidents back to Ronald Reagan have increased the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), a cash supplement to earnings, and liberalized the eligibility conditions for Medicaid.
These improvements in benefit generosity have made it easier for unskilled breadwinners to support
their children, even in very poorly paid jobs.  At the same time cash assistance payments have
become much less generous for parents who do not work, liberalization of EITC and Medicaid has
improved the potential living standards of parents forced to work in low-wage jobs.
It is not yet clear how quickly or effectively states will implement new welfare-to-work and
workfare programs.  Nor do analysts know how states will ultimately react to the financial incentives
in the new law.  How many states will use their own resources to pay for cash assistance, child care
help, or transportation grants to recipients who exhaust eligibility for federally subsidized benefits?
Will competition among states lead to lower monthly payments or tighter time limits?  How will
recessions affect states’ willingness to pay for family assistance?  As of spring 1998, many states had
not yet implemented a full strategy to move recipients from welfare rolls to employment.
This paper considers a fairly narrow question: Is it likely that single parents who have been
dependent on welfare will be able to support themselves with jobs currently available to them?  I
examine the challenges faced by welfare recipients in their search for employment, the job skills they
bring to the job market, and the changing nature of the market in which they will work.  Because the
employment rate of public aid recipients has historically been low, it is plausible to expect states can- 3 -
significantly boost the percentage of recipients who hold jobs.  In fact, in many states a sizable
increase has already occurred.  Perhaps surprisingly, it is also realistic to expect that the great
majority of new jobs will be unsubsidized jobs in the private labor market.  The U.S. labor market
has enormous capacity to produce private-sector jobs, even for unskilled workers, if an ample supply
of workers is available to fill these jobs.  Unfortunately, aid recipients typically have such limited
education and skills that few of them will qualify for well-paying jobs.  The evidence suggests that
most assistance recipients will earn $6.00 to $7.50 per hour or less if they are forced to hold jobs.
Moreover, the trend in wages over the past two decades has been negative, especially for workers
with limited skills.  If welfare reform forces millions of aid recipients to find jobs, the added supply
of unskilled workers could accelerate the long-term trend toward lower wages.
The best evidence suggests that a substantial minority of welfare recipients and their children
would face extreme hardship if forced to rely solely on the adult recipients’ earnings.  While it is
realistic to expect that most adult recipients can find and hold jobs, at least eventually, it is
unrealistic to believe the U.S. job market will provide all of them with an adequate standard of
living. Fortunately, public policy in the United States has moved gradually toward providing far
more benefits to low-wage workers who are the breadwinners of families containing children.   The
Earned Income Tax Credit, Medicaid health insurance, and child care subsidies have been
significantly expanded since 1986.  The increased value of these kinds of benefits has more than
offset the drop in real earnings and employer-provided fringe benefits for many parents who must
support their children in low-wage jobs.
Characteristics and Work Experience of Dependent Single Mothers
The goal of the new federal law and most state reform efforts is to move dependent parents
off the assistance rolls and into jobs.  The great majority of families receiving cash aid for indigent
children are headed by single mothers, many of whom face formidable challenges in finding and
keeping full-time jobs. 
Preparation for work and recent job experience.  One way to assess the job prospects of
welfare recipients is to examine the job qualifications and actual work experience of aid-dependent
mothers.  The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regularly publishes information- 4 -
about the characteristics, including the work behavior, of aid recipients using data obtained from its
quality control surveys.  Data from these surveys show that few recipients work and suggest that
many recipients would face serious problems in finding and holding jobs.  The age distribution of
children collecting public assistance has grown younger over time, as the percentage of children
younger than age 6, and especially under age three, has climbed.  Women, whether married or
unmarried, raising very young children usually find it much harder to work than do women who are
childless or whose children are 6 years old or older.  The educational attainment of aid-dependent
mothers, though improving, remains low.  The DHHS survey shows that 40 percent of mothers
receiving welfare had failed to complete high school in 1994.  In comparison, more than 85 percent
of all 25-34 year-old American women had completed high school in that year.  About 1 percent of
recipient mothers had graduated from college, whereas 23 percent of all 25-34 year-old women have
a college degree. Only 15 percent of mothers collecting welfare reported one or more years of
college, whereas slightly more than half of all 25-34 year-old women had attended at least a year of
college.
Less than 9 percent of the cases included in the DHHS control survey showed evidence of
current wage income.  Some mothers who report no earnings to welfare offices may nonetheless earn
unreported wages or receive irregular labor income that goes unreported.  In addition, many women
who initially file for assistance benefits have earned wages in the recent past.  Over 60 percent of
first-time claimants for welfare report work experience within the year prior to filing for AFDC
(Pavetti, 1995, p. 33).  In the mid-1980s, almost three-quarters of the typical welfare caseload
reported some employment experience within the past five years (Maynard, 1995, p. 112).  Most
available evidence suggests, however, that a majority of single women who are long-term recipients
of cash assistance do not work and do not have recent work experience.  In welfare-to-work
experiments conducted in Alameda and Los Angeles Counties, California, for example, only 17-24
percent of the long-term AFDC recipients enrolled in the experiments reported any work experience
within two years prior to their entry into the program (Riccio et al., 1994, p. 18).  Most of these long-
term recipients had received AFDC continuously for at least three years at the time they entered the
experiments.- 5 -
Although there is no definitive study of the labor market experience of single women after
they enter the assistance rolls, most studies suggest that a substantial minority of dependent mothers
may become employed only after very lengthy periods without work, even when they are enrolled
in special training or job placement programs.  Daniel Friedlander and Gary Burtless (1995)
examined the long-term effects of four welfare-to-work experiments conducted during the 1980s.
In the fifth year after women were enrolled in these experiments, the employment rate averaged 38
percent among women who had been enrolled in the experimental welfare-to-work programs and
36 percent among women who had been enrolled in the control group.   The findings from welfare-
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to-work experiments suggest extraordinary efforts will be needed to boost the employment rates of
single welfare mothers to rates that are typical among American mothers more generally.  For
purposes of comparison, about 66 percent of American women who have children under age 18 are
employed; 48 percent of never-married mothers are employed; and 69 percent of widowed, divorced,
and separated mothers with children under 18 hold jobs (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1996, p.
400).
Another source of information about the job qualifications of welfare recipients is the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).  The NLSY is an annual survey of young people
who were first interviewed in 1979, when respondents were between 14 and 22 years old.  Each year,
the survey collects information on educational attainment, employment, and reliance on welfare.
About a year after they entered the sample, most respondents completed a cognitive test known as
the Armed Forces Qualification Test (or AFQT), which is used to determine which applicants are
eligible to enlist in the military.  The composite AFQT score is considered a reliable indicator of test
takers’ general problem-solving ability.
Information about young women’s educational attainment and aptitude scores derived from
the annual NLSY survey confirms that women collecting cash assistance have serious educational
deficiencies.  Table 1 shows the educational attainments and aptitude scores of three groups of
women, defined by their use of AFDC in the 12 months before their interview at age 25.  The least
dependent group of 25-year-olds, comprising 92 percent of the sample, received no AFDC during
those 12 months. Three percent received benefits during at least 1 but less than 12 months of the
previous year.  The most dependent 5 percent received benefits in all 12 months.- 6 -
Whereas only 14 percent of the women who did not rely on AFDC had failed to complete
high school by age 25, among those who were most dependent on AFDC the comparable figure was
52 percent. AFDC recipients also performed poorly on standardized tests of ability and achievement.
In the most dependent category, 72 percent of the women obtained a score on the AFQT placing
them in the bottom quarter of all test takers.  Only 12 percent placed in the top half of test takers.
Women who are moderately dependent on AFDC achieved better test scores, but their performance
on the test was well below the national norm.  Only 16 percent obtained a score that placed them in
the top half of test takers.  Limited education and poor performance on standardized tests greatly
restrict the kinds of jobs that most aid recipients can obtain.
Realistic expectations about employment.  A large minority of welfare recipients can typically
be expected to leave the welfare rolls within a year or less after entering the rolls.  Many of them will
leave welfare to take jobs, while others will leave the rolls because of a change in family
composition or some other change that affects their continued eligibility for welfare.  Women who
remain dependent on welfare for longer periods face a variety of obstacles to finding and holding a
job.  Many people who are sympathetic to the plight of poor single mothers view these obstacles as
insurmountable “barriers” to employment.  This viewpoint is unrealistic.  Only a minority -- probably
a small minority -- of single mothers is prevented from working as a result of an insurmountable
“barrier” to employment.  It is more sensible to speak of the costs of entering employment.  If society
as a whole or single mothers themselves are willing to pay these costs, paid employment is a
practical option for the great majority of mothers collecting welfare.  The problem, of course, is that
mothers may be unwilling to bear these costs if the reward they receive from working is small.  Since
most welfare recipients do not have the skills that equip them to hold highly paid jobs, even a
relatively minor cost of employment -- such as a $3.00-per-day bus fare -- may seem to constitute
an formidable barrier to employment.
The educational and skill deficiencies of assistance recipients restrict access to most well-
paying occupations, but they do not preclude employment altogether.  An unskilled welfare recipient,
if she is able-bodied and moderately resourceful, can almost certainly find an employer willing to
offer her a job if she is willing to accept a low enough wage and an inexpensive package of fringe
benefits.  In many urban labor markets, for example, jobless workers with few qualifications apply- 7 -
to temporary employment agencies for short-term work.  Although the employment is uncertain and
irregular, workers who are diligent and persistent can usually obtain temporary work assignments,
at least occasionally, and can often find permanent employment if their job performance impresses
a manager who has provided a short-term assignment.  Other job opportunities for less qualified
workers can be found in low-wage retailing, cleaning services, agriculture, manual labor, and
informal child care.  With relatively little training, less educated women can work as home health
aides.
None of these job opportunities offers promising prospects for a good income or long-term
advancement.  It is important to recognize, however, that job opportunities exist for applicants who
are willing to accept them, a fact confirmed by the job-finding success of unskilled immigrants.
Many immigrants enter the United States suffering even worse disadvantages than those of long-term
welfare recipients.  Immigrants often have less schooling than welfare recipients, and many of them
cannot speak English.  Immigrants who illegally reside in the United States are not eligible to collect
income transfers, except emergency medical aid, so they must rely on their own earnings or
contributions from relatives in order to survive.  The great majority find jobs, and some unskilled
immigrants eventually prosper.
It is less certain that unskilled AFDC recipients could find poorly paid jobs if hundreds of
thousands or even millions of them were forced to find jobs within a one- or two-year period.  If half
of the 3 million adults who currently receive cash aid were removed from the welfare rolls, 1.5
million additional unskilled workers would flood the labor market looking for jobs.  Though
employers can eventually create enough unskilled positions to employ most of these job seekers, it
is unrealistic to expect that new jobs will be created overnight.  Most former aid recipients will face
a lengthy wait before finding a job.  In the long run, however, the skill deficiencies of assistance
recipients do not constitute an insurmountable barrier to employment.
Taking into account the practical obstacles to work faced by most single mothers, it is not
unreasonable to expect that at least three-quarters of current welfare recipients could contribute to
their own support through wage earnings.  Nearly all except those with very young children could
be expected to work in full-time jobs.  In many cases, aid recipients’ work experience will turn out- 8 -
to be intermittent.  The U.S. labor market offers few steady jobs to workers who have a serious
deficit in skills.
Potential Earnings
The low educational attainment and limited skills of aid recipients restrict the kinds of jobs
they can hold.  Recipients who find employment often end up in jobs that pay very meager wages,
a fact illustrated in Figure 1.  The chart shows trends over an eleven-year period in hourly wages
received by a sample of one-time AFDC recipients interviewed in the NLSY.  To be included in the
sample, women had to be between 18 and 22 years old in 1979 and receive AFDC benefits sometime
between 1979 and 1981.  In many years between 1979 and 1990, fewer than half of the women in
this population worked.  Figure 1 shows the real hourly wages of working women in the sample
whose earnings placed them at three points in the wage distribution -- at the 10th, 50th, and 90th
percentiles.  (Bear in mind that the calculations include only those women who held a job and had
a reported wage.)  The top line, for example, shows wages received by women who earned more than
90 percent of the sample of working one-time AFDC recipients but earned less than the top 10
percent of these former recipients.  The lowest line traces wage movements among women who
earned more than the bottom 10 percent of working one-time AFDC recipients but earned less than
90 percent of working former AFDC recipients.  The middle line shows the median wage received
by working women who once received AFDC benefits.
From 1979 to 1990 the median real wage of women who once received AFDC rose from
$6.07 to $6.72 an hour -- an annual wage gain of $0.06 per hour, or a bit less than 1 percent a year.
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Near the top of the wage distribution, at the 90th percentile, wages climbed to a respectable level,
reaching almost $12.00 an hour by 1990.  However, the great majority of young women who
received AFDC in 1979-1981 did not fare as well.  The women whose wages placed them at the 10th
percentile of working former recipients, for example, saw their wages fall to $4.26.
The hourly wage figures may be more understandable if they are converted into flows of
annual earnings. In 1979, the median wage of $6.07 received by women who were once dependent
on AFDC would yield slightly more than $12,000 a year for a person working on a full-time, year-
round schedule (2,000 hours per year).  By 1990 a woman earning the median wage in this sample- 9 -
could expect to earn $13,400 if she worked on a full-time, year-round schedule.  These “potential”
earnings are just 15 percent greater than the poverty line for a family of three.  This means that, even
in the unlikely event that welfare recipients could all find and retain full-time, year-round jobs, many
would struggle with annual incomes that remain depressingly low.
As bleak as this sounds, it probably overstates the wages most aid recipients can expect to
earn.  The median wage received by former recipients who actually work is greater than the wage
that nonworking recipients could earn if they found jobs.  As noted earlier, only about 50 percent of
the women who collected AFDC between 1979 and 1981 reported working in a given year after
1981.  And only the wages of working mothers are reflected in Figure 1.  On average, nonworking
women had fewer qualifications than those who worked, so if they found jobs most would earn
wages that fall below the median wages displayed in Figure 1.
When estimating potential earnings, it is also unrealistic to expect that all single women with
young children will be able to work full-time on a year-round basis.  Many will choose to work part-
time in order to make child rearing more feasible.  Others will spend part of the year without jobs
as a result of involuntary unemployment, illness, or difficulty in arranging child care.
Unemployment is a particular hazard for these women, because many of them will land jobs in which
turnover is high.
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Broader labor market trends.  The U.S. labor market in many respects appears quite healthy.
Unlike Canada and Western Europe, the United States has seen little long-term trend toward higher
unemployment.  The number of employed Americans grew by over 30 million since 1980, while the
number of payroll jobs climbed more than 35 percent.  On balance, the number of jobs climbed faster
than the working-age population, indicating that the economy has little problem generating enough
jobs to keep potential new workers employed.  The economy’s success in generating new jobs has
not been matched by a capacity to generate middle-income jobs.  Although there has been a
substantial increase in the number of jobs which pay $80,000 per year or more, there has also been
a rapid growth in the number of jobs paying $15,000 per year or less.
The latter trend is particularly relevant to cash assistance recipients, since only a handful can
expect to find jobs that pay extremely high wages.  The employment prospects of aid recipients were
bleak in the 1980s, as we have seen, but their prospects deteriorated after 1989.  Overall wage- 10 -
inequality in the United States has increased since the mid-1970s for both men and women.  For
men, the rise in inequality meant a significant drop in earnings among workers with limited skills.
Until the 1990s, rising inequality among women involved wage stagnation or slow wage growth
among the least skilled and sharply increasing wages for the highly skilled.  Until recently, women
with limited occupational skills did not suffer sizable losses in real hourly or annual earnings.  Since
1989, however, less-skilled women have also experienced significant earnings losses.
The effects of rising wage inequality are evident in Figure 2, which shows trends in weekly
wages among unmarried mothers who are between 18 and 44 years old.   Each bar represents the
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1979-1993 change in real weekly earnings at a selected point in the earnings distribution of working
unmarried mothers.  The chart shows a remarkable pattern of wage divergence over the 14-year
period.  Real wages sank at the bottom of the distribution, fell slightly in the middle, and grew at the
top.  Unmarried mothers in the bottom 25 percent of earners saw their wages tumble by between 23
percent and 32 percent, with the largest declines occurring at the very bottom of the distribution.  
The jump in earnings inequality has been the focus of much research by economists, who
have tried to discover why earnings shrank at the bottom while continuing to grow at the top.   Part
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of the growth in inequality is due to the fact that employers are increasingly willing to reward
workers who have more education, skill, and work experience.  The flip side, of course, is that the
earnings penalty for limited skill is now much harsher.  Substantial declines in earnings have
occurred among young workers and workers with little education.  
The wage developments shown in Figure 2 have important implications for U.S. welfare
reform.  The great majority of adult assistance recipients are young unmarried mothers who have no
schooling beyond high school.  Their skills typically prepare them for poorly paid jobs.  The wages
on these jobs are not only low, until very recently they were declining at a rate of about 1 percent a
year.  Because welfare has been reformed in a way that forces more unmarried mothers into the labor
market, we should expect that the added supply of unskilled workers will push down wages relative
to where they would be if the old welfare system had been retained.
In 1993, the full-time gross wage paid to a 25-34 year-old unmarried mother who was a high
school dropout averaged slightly more than $230 a week.  This was approximately equal to the
poverty threshold for a family containing three members.  Without the income supplementation- 11 -
provided by the EITC and food stamps, most single mothers who are asked to live on earnings this
low will be forced, at least occasionally, to consider applying for cash public assistance.  In states
offering relatively high assistance benefits, the combination of assistance and food stamps can
sometimes provide welfare recipients with a higher standard of living than the one unskilled single
mothers can achieve through work alone.  Of course, when their eligibility for cash benefits is
exhausted, they will be forced to rely on their own earnings.  In many cases, those earnings will be
very meager.
What Has Happened So Far?  What Will Happen in the Future?
The federal reform passed in 1996 as well as state-level reforms enacted in earlier years have
almost certainly boosted aggregate employment and the labor force participation rate.  We can
anticipate that welfare reform will increase employment and participation even more in the future.
Working-age adults who have relied on cash assistance will be forced under new state programs to
search for work, enroll in training programs, or accept workfare jobs.  Experience over the past
decade suggests these measures will significantly reduce the welfare rolls.  In most cases, the
employment rates of able-bodied adults enrolled in the programs will increase.  Sometimes the
increase will occur because state programs will be effective in linking recipients to private job
opportunities.  In other cases the increase may occur because recipients dislike the added hassle of
participating in a work program.  They will seek and find alternatives to public assistance, and these
alternatives often -- though not always -- will include gainful employment.
To estimate the likely effect on overall employment, it is helpful to consider the number of
working-age adults who receive welfare.  The focus here is on the AFDC program and its successor
program,  TANF.  In 1994, 5.05 million families received AFDC.  Of these, 4.18 million (or 83
percent) contained at least one adult member and 0.32 million (8 percent) contained two adult
members (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 1996, p. 479).  Figure
3 shows trends in the AFDC / TANF caseload since 1960.  As of September 1997, 3.55 million
families were collecting assistance payments under AFDC or TANF.  Slightly more than 3 million
contained an adult member who will be subject to the work requirements under new state laws.  For
purposes of comparison, this number was 2.2 percent of the number of labor force participants in the- 12 -
September 1997, 2.3 percent of aggregate civilian employment, and 44 percent of the number of
unemployed.
Welfare reform has already affected the labor market status of a couple of hundred thousand
former or would-be recipients.  The sharp decline in the rolls from their peak in 1994 is at least partly
due to state-level reforms that began before Congress passed the federal reform law in August 1996.
As indicated in a recent research paper by the U.S. Council of Economic Advisors, a large part of
the decline (perhaps 40 percent) may be due to policy reform while much of the remainder is
probably due to the improving economy.  The change in labor force behavior of the group that is
most likely to receive welfare benefits -- currently unmarried or separated mothers who live with
their own children under 18 -- is reflected in Figure 4.  The top panel in the figure shows a sharp rise
in the labor force participation rate of unmarried mothers in relation to that of married mothers who
live with their spouse during the mid-1990s.  The comparative rise in the employment-population
ratio of unmarried mothers, shown in the lower panel, is even more noticeable.  The labor force
participation and employment-population rates of unmarried mothers began to rise strongly in 1995,
and these rates continued to rise at a rapid pace through the end of 1997.  The experimental state
welfare reform programs enacted before 1996 and the 1996 change in the federal law appear to have
caused a significant change in the behavior of unmarried mothers.
If the unemployment rate remains below 6 percent, I suspect that as many as half of the 3
million adults on welfare will move into unsubsidized or workfare jobs over the next five years.
Thus, if the labor market remains reasonably tight most of the change in aid recipients’ labor force
status will occur because of movements out of the labor force into employment rather than into
unemployment.  This prediction is based on the assumption that most states will eventually adopt
tight deadlines ensuring that the great majority aid recipients who collect benefits longer than two
years will be forced to accept private-sector or workfare jobs if they want their assistance benefits
to continue.  A large fraction of states have already adopted such a policy (see Center on Hunger and
Poverty, 1998).
Of course, not all of the employment gain will occur right away.  At first, we should
anticipate that many aid recipients will enter unemployment before finding a job.  This may boost
the percentage of current aid recipients who are unemployed.  The experience of the U.S. job market- 13 -
over the past three decades suggests, however, that the availability of an extra 1½ - 2 million
potential workers will eventually result in added employment for most of them.  The net gain in
aggregate employment will be somewhat less than the employment gain among parents of needy
children.
Additional employment opportunities will probably become available to needy parents as a
result of the creation of a relatively small number of workfare jobs and the creation of a much larger
number of private or unsubsidized public-sector jobs.  Employers will create these jobs in response
to the influx of a sizable number of workers who will be available at low wages.  In fact, wages in
the low-skill job market should be depressed, other things equal, as a result of the entry of former
or would-be welfare recipients.  The lower wage will make it profitable for employers to offer jobs
they would not otherwise have offered.  But it will also reduce slightly the participation rate and
employment-to-population ratio of low-skilled workers who compete with welfare recipients, for
example, secondary family earners (teenagers and wives without recent work experience), less
skilled legal and illegal immigrants, and low-skill men.
New Policies to Alleviate Working-age Poverty
Although European and Canadian critics of U.S. policy may not recognize the fact, U.S.
policymakers have not stood still in the face of the big deterioration in the labor market position of
unskilled workers.  The overall direction of policy has shifted significantly since the early 1980s.
The Reagan and Bush Administrations left the U.S. minimum wage fixed in nominal terms, lowering
its value in relation to economy-wide average wages and reducing its purchasing power.  Although
the minimum wage has been increased modestly over the past decade, the relative and absolute value
of the U.S. minimum wage remains far below its level in the 1960s and 1970s.  U.S. tax and transfer
programs for the working-age poor have also been changed significantly.  Public assistance benefits
for the nonworking poor have been substantially curtailed, as already noted.  But the Reagan, Bush,
and Clinton Administrations also created and expanded government programs to help the working
poor.
The latter policy shift began in the mid-1980s.  The 1986 tax reform increased the income
threshold where families began to pay positive income taxes, removing millions of poor families- 14 -
from the positive tax rolls.  The EITC was dramatically liberalized in legislation passed in 1986,
1990, and 1993.  This income tax credit essentially subsidizes the wage earnings of low-income
adults who have child dependents.  In addition, the federal government and many state governments
established programs to subsidize the child care expenses of former public assistance recipients who
left the welfare rolls to enter paid employment.  As part of the welfare reform initiative of the 1990s,
much more extensive child care assistance has been made available to current and former welfare
recipients and (in some states) to working poor parents who have never received public assistance.
In the late 1980s the Medicaid health insurance program was also liberalized to provide
insurance benefits on a large scale to low-income children with working poor parents.  Up until the
late 1980s, this kind of publicly subsidized health insurance had mainly been provided to working-
age families containing children only if the families were actually collecting public assistance
benefits.  (In a small number of cases, low-income wage earners with very low wages were permitted
to enroll in the program.)  The Medicaid liberalization of the late 1980s and early 1990s meant that
for the first time children could be enrolled in the publicly subsidized health insurance program even
if their parents had moderate amounts of earnings.  Until this reform was implemented, many
families lost their eligibility for free health insurance for their children when the family breadwinner
left the cash public assistance program and returned to work.  In the past few years, some state
governments have also established subsidized public health insurance programs for all members of
working-poor families, including the breadwinners in the families.  The federal government passed
legislation in 1997 that offers states generous federal subsidies to establish or enlarge this kind of
subsidized health insurance plan.
The Earned Income Tax Credit.  The most distinctive innovation in U.S. public policy toward
the working poor has been the EITC.  While most cash assistance is received by people who do not
work, the EITC goes only to low-income people who do work.  The EITC provides as much as
$3,656 in refundable income tax credits to a breadwinner with two or more dependents.  For a person
earning the minimum wage who works 2,000 hours per year and pays social security taxes, the EITC
increases the worker’s net annual earnings by 38½ percent.  This earnings supplement probably
offsets almost all of the reduction in real hourly wages that low-wage workers have suffered over
the past two decades. - 15 -
The idea behind the program is to provide work incentives by increasing the incomes or
services available to women who leave the welfare rolls and join the work force.  The EITC
supplements the wage earnings of low-income breadwinners by providing them with refundable
income tax credits.  Instead of shrinking as a recipient's earnings grow, the credit rises, at least up
to a specified limit.  At low earnings levels the credit increases by 34¢ or 40¢ for each extra dollar
earned by the breadwinner.  Parents who have no wages are not eligible to receive the credit, so the
credit provides an incentive for unemployed parents to find work.
The maximum credit is now a little over $3,650 a year for families containing two or more
children.  This credit level is achieved when annual earnings reach about $9,000.  When a family's
earnings rise above a moderate threshold (about $12,000 in 1997), the credit is gradually phased out.
It is eliminated altogether when a family's income exceeds about $29,000 a year.  (The EITC benefit
schedules for families with one child and with two or more children are displayed in Figure 5.)  The
credit now transfers even more money to low-income families with children than the main cash
public assistance program for children.  About 19 million families received a credit averaging $1,470
in 1997.  Both the maximum amount of the credit and the total amount of credit paid to low-income
breadwinners have increased rapidly during the 1990s (see Figure 6).
It is still too early to assess the overall impact of the EITC on work effort of the poor.  Some
potential breadwinners who would otherwise be unemployed have been encouraged to take jobs as
a result of the credit.  By raising the net income a family can receive when the breadwinner goes to
work, the EITC can tip the balance in favor of work and against continued joblessness.  From the
point of view of public perceptions, this is by far the most powerful argument in favor of the
program.  It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, however, that this employment-increasing effect of
the program must be partly offset by the program’s work disincentive effects among families earning
between $11,930 and $29,000 a year.  There are more breadwinners in the income range where extra
work effort is discouraged than there are breadwinners earning less than $8,935, who are encouraged
to begin working or to work harder.  Hence, the EITC may not increase work effort much in the
aggregate.
The most powerful economic argument in favor of the EITC is that it raises the net incomes
of participating families without causing sizable reductions in their own self-support.  In comparison- 16 -
with other methods of reducing the tax burdens or raising the transfer benefits of the working poor,
the EITC has a relatively small work disincentive effect and probably encourages work on balance.
Recent empirical evidence suggests the program is actually increasing overall work effort by
increasing the hours of work and employment rates of breadwinners with very low wages or no
previous earnings at all.
The program is certainly succeeding in transferring large amounts of income to the poor.  The
substantial increase in generosity of benefits during the 1990s has also dramatically increased the
number of pre-transfer poor people who are lifted above the poverty line.  The Census Bureau
estimates that 4.3 million poor persons were removed from poverty as a result of the EITC benefits
they received.  This number is a little over 12 percent of the number of people who would be poor
if they did not receive EITC benefits.  It is also a large increase compared with number of people
removed from poverty by the program in the early 1990s, when only 2 million persons (or 5½
percent of the pretransfer poor) were removed from poverty as a result of EITC benefits.
The distinctive U.S. policy mix.   The United States has adopted a distinctive set of policies
to change work incentives for the working-age poor.  The minimum wage has been allowed to
shrink, making it cheaper for employers to offer jobs to the unskilled (but reducing the attractiveness
of employment for the unskilled).  In addition, several transfer programs have become much less
generous to the nonworking (but working age) poor.  Other transfer programs have been modified
to become much more generous to the working poor or to poor breadwinners who leave the public
assistance rolls.  For many low-income families containing children, the improvements in generosity
of Medicaid, state-subsidized health insurance benefits, child care subsidies, and the EITC have more
than offset the loss of earnings caused by shrinking real wages.   Official U.S. poverty statistics do
not reflect this improvement because they fail to account for most of these improvements in benefits.
The policies may be having real economic effects in addition to offsetting the drop in real
wages.  Poor breadwinners with children may be induced to enter the work force and remain
employed, even if they are paid poor wages or must accept jobs offering no fringe benefits.  The
entry of these workers may even have contributed to the drop in wages among the least skilled.  In
effect, public transfers or tax credits for the working poor are “subsidizing” employers’ creation of
poorly paying jobs.  The availability of Medicaid and state-subsidized health insurance for the- 17 -
working poor has probably affected employers’ decisions about whether to offer and how much to
subsidize employer-sponsored health insurance plans.  Employers may now reason that they do not
have to subsidize child dependents’ health benefits as generously as they did in the past, especially
in low paid jobs.  Because the government now offers to provide child dependents’ health insurance
for free to working poor families, employers are relieved of the expense of providing that kind of
coverage to their low-wage employees.
In comparison with Canada and Western Europe, the U.S. combination of policies
encourages entry into the job market among low-skilled people with child dependents.  But the new
combination of policies also permits U.S. employers to create many poorly paying jobs at low cost,
and it provides employers an implicit subsidy to do so.  Some of the fringe benefits associated with
these jobs -- such as health insurance for dependents and inexpensive child care -- are now financed
out of the public budget rather than out of company contributions to worker welfare funds or
household budgets.  The combination of coerced entry into the job market and rapid job creation is
almost certainly more consistent with popular American attitudes than the policy combination that
prevails in Canada and Europe.  Many European countries have favored a combination of policies
that imposes high costs on employers and comparatively high marginal tax rates on potential
breadwinners who leave public transfer rolls in order to become employed.  The European policy
combination contributes to higher real wages, but it also tends to produce higher joblessness and
slower employment growth.  Although this is a policy combination that many European voters
clearly prefer, I doubt that it is a combination whose effects would be welcome to U.S. voters.  On
the whole, Americans seem more tolerant of high levels of inequality and more willing to accept the
increases in inequality that have accompanied the economic shifts of the past two decades.- 18 -
1.   The control group consisted of randomly selected AFDC recipients who were not enrolled in the
experimental work and training program.  See Friedlander and Burtless (1995), p. 88.
2.   Wages are measured in constant 1993 dollars using the CPI-U-X1 deflator.  For purposes of
comparison, among all women aged 18-22 in 1979, including both recipients and nonrecipients of
AFDC, the median wage climbed fairly rapidly.  It rose from $6.27 an hour in 1979 to $9.39 an hour in
1990, a wage gain of 4.5 percent or $0.28 per year.
3.   Blank et al. (1995), pp. 39-40.
4.   The women are never-married, divorced, or separated mothers who live with unmarried own children
who are under age 18.
5.   For recent surveys see Levy and Murnane (1992) and Burtless (1994).
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Table 1.
Educational Attainment and Ability Scores of 25-Year-Old Women,
by AFDC Status
  Percent
Number of months received AFDC    All
12 1-11 None    Women
 Educational attainment by age 24
Less than 4 years high school 52  44  14  17 
4 years high school 35  48  40  39 
1-3 years college 12  8  24  23 
4 or more years college 0  0  22  21 
Total      100 100 100  100 
 Composite score on 1980 AFQT
Bottom  quartile 72 52 22  26 
2nd  quartile 17 33 26  25 
3rd  quartile 9 14 26  25 
Top quartile 3  2  25  24 
Total      100 100 100  100 
   Source:   Author's tabulations of National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979-1991). - 22 -- 23 -- 24 -- 25 -
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